Many authors have warned that what is often considered authentic customary law in the sense that it was not affected by Western influence was in fact fundamentally influenced by colonial rule. The terms „invented” or „invented” customary law are proposed to indicate the modified nature of customary law as it is common today. Some authors argue that it does not make sense to speak of customary law as a modified or transformed form of Aboriginal law, because what has been constructed by state institutions is an entirely new type of law invented by the state (Moore 1986, Wiber 1993). In today`s world, we have become accustomed to certain features of our legal systems. We take many of them for granted; For example, the legal equality of citizens, the state`s monopoly on the use of force, and legal homogeneity – the existence of a uniform legal system within a territorial jurisdiction. One of the most extensive systems of legal pluralism was found in ancient India, where individuals are part of „many”. Companies at the same time. For example, a weaver would belong to one (1) caste, (2) guild, (3) belong to a village, and (4) „live on land belonging to . a temple.
Moreover, the weaver would probably live under the jurisdiction of a local feudal ruler and a more distant monarch. All of these groups and entities would have their own courts and laws that would allow for several „legal restrictions and possibilities.” Normative recognition of a customary or religious legal system has occurred when the norms of that system have been incorporated into the body of norms of the State legal system. State law could, for example, provide that land rights may be transferred according to procedures established by customary law norms, or that inheritance of property may be determined by customary and religious norms. The incorporated standards then became enforceable in state courts. This also occurred in most African colonial legal systems and has continued to this day. Institutional recognition of a customary or religious legal system has occurred when the institutions of that system have been incorporated into a State legal system, for example when chiefs have become administrative officials or judges of the State. This often occurred in the British colonies, in accordance with the policy of indirect government, which sought to govern the colonies by indigenous forms of government. With the abandonment of politics from the 1940s onwards, this recognition lost its importance, but it continued in a limited form. In other colonies, it was adopted as a concession to local opinion as well as for practical reasons; It has continued there since independence. The recognition of the importance of non-state legal forms has led socio-legal theorists to rethink their thinking on the relationship between law and society. The suggestion that the law of the State and its institutions for the administration of justice are merely a form of social control has been an essential feature of legal pluralism since the foundations of legal theory. However, the pluralistic legal tradition has focused on the character, source and hierarchical place of non-State normative orders in relation to State law.
Until the mid-1970s, much of their argument explored the relationship between Indigenous tribal customs and European colonial law (Pospisil, 1971). This tradition regarded indigenous orders as autonomous, independent, but subordinate to colonial law. By the mid-1980s, the focus had shifted to non-colonial societies, but continued to be concerned with the hierarchical balance of power between dominant and subordinate legal forms. Therefore, many critical theorists view „informal judicial institutions” as a subordinate normative order and examine how they fulfill the ideological function of blurring state power so that it appears as a benign part of the social fabric. They have shown that this ideological subordination is achieved through the co-optation and exploitation of a human desire for informal and localized communal justice, and that the episodic tendency towards „informal” and decentralized state control has a dual function of legitimizing and clearly expanding state control (Cohen 1985). However, this criticism seems to apply more to the growth of state-sponsored dispute resolution institutions, community policing, and restorative justice than to explaining the state`s interrelationship with other established private legal systems that have been largely ignored.